Abstract-An analytic characterization of the process of executing a well-defined decisionmaking task by a human decisionmaker is presented. A basic two-stage model of this process is introduced in which external situations are first assessed and then responses are selected. An information theoretic framework is used in which internal activity is described not only in terms of transmission or throughput, but also in terms of coordination, internal decisionmaking, and blockage. A constraint on the total rate of internal processing is suggested as a model of bounded rationality for this case. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are derived and their properties analyzed in terms of performance and workload. Finally, direct and indirect controls are discussed as models of the decisionmaker's interaction with the organization.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ROLE of the human decisionmaker is central to the design and evaluation of alternative organizational structures. Each structure includes a number of interacting decisionmakers (DM's) who must make compatible decisions in overlapping areas of responsibility using different data. Such structures appear often in tactical military situations where the functioning of the organization depends heavily on the command, control, and communications (C3) system that supports it. Implicit in a C3 system is an information structure and a decision structure. The analysis of the interactions between the information and decision structures is a useful step in the development of measures of effectiveness for C3 systems.
In order to study structures of decisionmaking organizations, it is necessary to develop a simple basic model of the interacting decisionmaker. The approach taken in this paper is to consider a model that is appropriate for a narrow but important class of problems. The underlying assumption is that the decisionmakers have been assigned specific functions for which they are well trained. The tempo of operations is assumed to be fast (e.g., a tactical situation) and to impose constraints on the DM's.
In previous work on the determination of decision strategies based on organization-wide objectives [1] - [3] , a team-theoretic approach was used in which the DM's were assumed to be perfectly rational, i.e., each DM was allowed a given set of alternatives, had some knowledge of the consequences of choosing a particular alternative, and could Manuscript received July 20, 1981;  rank order the alternatives with respect to some index of performance [4] . Optimal decision strategies were then obtained.
An alternative hypothesis is that the decisionmaker exhibits bounded rationality [5] , i.e., no matter how intendedly rational he is, he is subject to constraints that derive from the limitations of human beings as processors of information and problem solvers. March and Simon [4] suggest that the DM with bounded rationality seeks to find an alternative which is satisfactory with respect to a given criterion, i.e., an alternative which satisfices. Information theoretic approaches to modeling the decisionmaker with bounded rationality have a long history (see, for example, Sheridan and Ferrell [6, ch. 6] ). The decisionmaker is modeled as an information channel that receives inputs from the environment and produces outputs. Drenick [7] , [8] considered bounds on the average time to process inputs into outputs and, in more recent work, Sen and Drenick [9] introduced adaptive channels as models of decisionmakers. Froyd and Bailey [10] considered a decisionmaker who has throughput constraints and constraints on the entropy of the input signal. Papadopoulos [ 11] used the basic model proposed by Drenick to model and solve the problem of the garbling decisionmaker.
The basic departure from previous information theoretic models is in the modeling of the internal processing of the inputs by the decisionmaker to produce outputs. This v;+,ey A +1k-*_not VIrl-, tL er d the 1 ltt" UttCLLUy, iiluues not only transmission, or throughput, but also internal decisionmaking, internal coordination, and blockage. Consequently, the limitations due to bounded rationality are modeled as a constraint on the total activity rather than on the throughput alone. March and Simon [4] have hypothesized that the decisionmaking process of the satisficing decisionmaker is a two-stage process of "discovery and selection." The first stage is that of determining the situation of the environment, while the second addresses the question of what action to take in a particular situation. Selection in the first stage takes the form of choosing the degree and type of the "discovery" which the decisionmaker wishes to make regarding his environment, while discovery in the second stage pertains to generating possible courses of action for consideration. Clearly, the stages are coupled in that the type of alternatives sought depend on the situation per-ceived. Together they constitute the "construction of the decision situation" from which a decision emerges, since if the decisionmaking process has been carried out adequately, a satisfactory alternative is generated. Recent work by Wise [12] has supported this viewpoint.
Wohl [13] has suggested a similar two-stage model of the decision process through an extension of the classical stimulus-response model in psychology. When a stimulus is received the initial reaction of the decisionmaker is to hypothesize about its origin. This is followed by the generation and evaluation of options, among which one response is selected. Wohl applies the stimulus-hypothesis-optionresponse (SHOR) model in a military context to the tactical decision process.
In the model of the decisionmaker developed in the following sections internal decision strategies are introduced that determine the mapping between stimulus (input) and response (output). The total activity as well as the performance measure of the DM are then expressed in terms of the internal decision strategies. It is then shown that the optimal strategies are pure when the DM is unconstrained and mixed when the bounded rationality constraint is introduced. Similarly, in the satisficing context, it is shown that it is possible for the strategies to be only mixed. Also, the greater the uncertainty in the input or stimulus to the DM, the greater the total activity required in the internal decisionmaking process. This is consistent with aspects of organization theory [14] that relate, in a qualitative manner, the uncertainty in the task to be performed with the amount of information that must be processed within the organization during task execution in order to achieve a given level of performance. Thus, the model exhibits properties that are desirable from the point of view of studying the information structure of decisionmaking organizations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the model of the decisionmaking process is developed. In the following sections the decision strategies for optimization and satisficing problems are obtained and analyzed. Finally, the effect of interactions with the rest of the organization and the concepts of direct and indirect control are explored.
II. MODEL OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS Based on the above discussion, a two-stage model is assumed, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The decisionmaker receives an input x from his environment and uses it in the situation assessment (SA) stage to select a particular value of z, the variable that denotes the situation. Signals from the rest of the organization (RO) z' may modify the assessment of the situation and lead to a different value for z. Possible alternatives of action are then evaluated in the response selection (RS) stage. The outcome of this process is the selection of action or decision response y. A command input v' from the rest of the organization may affect the selection process.
Many classes of decisions can be represented by the process of Fig. 1 . Consideration in this paper will be restricted to decisionmaking tasks which are well-defined and which are performed in the steady-state, that is, the decisionmaker is assigned a particular task for which he is well-trained and which he performs again and again for successively arriving inputs. The first part of the SA stage can be considered as containing a set of well-defined procedures or algorithms which map the input stimuli x to the assessed situation z. The algorithms differ in the amount of resources required to process the input and in the quality of the assessment they produce. However no relation between these two attributes is assumed. The algorithms remain fixed as the process takes place; there is no adaptation or learning within each algorithm.
To be more precise, assume that the state of the decisionmaker's environment is x', an r-dimensional vector which takes values from a finite alphabet 6X. However the decisionmaker receives an input x, which is a noisy measurement of x'. The vector x is also r-dimensional and takes known values from a finite alphabet according to p(x).
The decisionmaker selects one of the U algorithms he possesses that map measurements x into assessed situations z, where z is an s-dimensional vector taking M values, with s < r. In the extreme case the situation assessment would involve an estimation of the entire state x'. However it is more likely that in order to choose an appropriate output or decision response, it is necessary to consider only some statistics determined from the measurement x. Thus z represents a possible aggregation of input data. Determining the degree of aggregation is a separate research problem not addressed here. The input-output mappings of the algorithms used to determine z from x are denoted by fi(x) where i = 1, 2, ., U. In this model U is finite and small. The implicit assumption is that the decisionmaker can choose from among a small set of prespecified procedures and that he cannot modify the set while executing his decisionmaking task. For a given x, the situation assessment is obtained by the realization of the variable u. This variable is one of the internal choices in the decisionmaking process; indeed, according to the model defined above it represents the real decision made in accomplishing the assessment task. This process can be represented as shown in Fig. 2 , where q is the noise source in the measurement of x', and x = x' + q. The internal choice has been represented as a switch which takes positions according to the realization of u.
The inputs to the decisionmaker are considered to be symbols generated by a source according to p(x). A mem- oryless source is assumed, i.e., each symbol is generated independently. The quantity
is defined to be the entropy of the source [15] measured in bits per symbol generated. The quantity H(x) can also be interpreted as the uncertainty regarding which value the random variable x will take.
If, in addition, the source is such that an input symbol is generated every T seconds on the average then , the mean symbol interarrival time, is a description of the " tempo" of operations [16] .
Each algorithm mapping x to z consists of a series of steps, such as intermediate computations or comparisons. These steps specify the variables of the algorithm. Suppose algorithm i contains ai variables denoted by wi= w i i (2) and let the algorithms have no variables in common, i.e., win w'= 0, i #z j; for all i,jE {1, 2,.* *, U) . (5) where Hx(.) is the conditional entropy (uncertainty) given by Hx(z) =-2 p(x) : p(z x) log2 p(z x).
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In the present case it reduces to
since x and u together determine the system S1 and x is assumed to be independent of u. The value of an arriving input is not known to the decisionmaker; rather, it is known only that an input is present and that it is an element of 9X. Indeed, it is the function of the situation assessment stage to identify the input and use it to determine the appropriate value of z. Conditioning the first stage internal decision on the value of x implies that preliminary processing must take place in order to identify x and to associate it with an appropriate situation assessment (SA) strategy p(u x). Such processing does not exist in the model under consideration and hence the SA strategy must be independent of x. The inclusion of a preassessment stage to accomplish preliminary processing or preprocessing is a straightforward extension of the model. If an algorithm is used exclusively (p(u = i) = 1 for some i) then H(u) = 0, which indicates that no real decision is being made. On the other hand, when p(u) is uniform, i.e., each algorithm is equally likely to be chosen, then H(u) is at a maximum. G,' is therefore interpreted to be the amount of internal decisionmaking in the situation assessment stage.
The mutual information or transmission [15] between x and z, written T(x: z), descnrbes the input-output relationship or throughput of the SA stage, which is denoted by GtI. Throughput is evaluated, by the definition, from T(x: z) = H(z) -Hx(z). (8) Recall that the fundamental quantity in H(z) is p(z);
similarly, p(z x) and p(x) are needed to evaluate Hx(z). A straightforward application of Bayes' rule, coupled with the knowledge of distribution p(x) and the algorithms fi(x), is sufficient to demonstrate that G/' is determined as an explicit function of the SA strategy p(u).
A quantity complementary to the throughput is that part of the input information which was not transmitted by the system, i.e., the blockage of the system. It is denoted Gb and given by
The total coordination in the situation assessment (SA) Fig. 2 , then the total coordination can be decomposed in terms of the internal coordination of each subsystem plus the coordination among subsystems [17] , [18] ; in this case (see Appendix) the decomposition is given by (11) i= I where g' denotes the internal coordination present in the ith algorithm, pi is the probability that the ith algorithm has been selected, i.e., pi p(u = i), and H(p) is the entropy of a random variable that can take one of two values with probability p [19] :
The expression for the total coordination (1 1) reflects the presence of switching within S'. The value of each gc depends on the internal variables of the algorithm and its implementation, and on the characteristics of the input.
The second term of (11) is interpreted to be the coordination required to switch among algorithms; it can also be regarded as the effort or resource use required to initialize the variables of an algorithm prior to its use. Examination of the mathematical expression for this coordination shows that it is dependent on Pi, the relative frequency of a particular algorithm's use, and furthermore, that each variable of the same algorithm makes an equal contribution to the total. The latter is not unreasonable, and the former is necessary because the coordination equation represents steady-state phenomena, i.e., the coordination required to initialize algorithms is very much related to the number of times on the average such initializations must take place. The symmetry of H(p) about p = 0.5 is significant because frequent use of an algorithm requires on the average the same number of initializations as equally infrequent use. This phenomenon arises because an often used algorithm is likely to be used for successive inputs, in which case no re-initialization would take place. Furthermore, since G/Z measures the global coordination among all variables of S', and since z is the only variable within S' which is related to all other variables, it is to be expected that GC contains the term H(z). The partition law of information [17] yields the following identity:
Equation (13) states that coordination, throughput, blockage, and internal decisionmaking taken together account for the total activity in a system. Alternatively, the total uncertainty G' can be computed as the sum of the entropy of each variable in S',
WC-SI The four quantities on the right side of (13) can be computed if the probability distributions p(x) and p(u) are known and if the algorithms fi and their specific realizations are given.
The full realization of the basic model of Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 3 . The first part of the situation assessment stage is as described in the previous paragraphs. The variable z', the supplementary situation assessment received from the rest of the organization, combines with some subset of the elements of z to produce z. The variables z and z are of the same dimension and take values from the same alphabet. The processing of z and z is accomplished by the subsystem SA which contains the deterministic algorithm A; the latter defines a set of aA variables, including z, labeled WA.
If there is no command input v', then the response selection (RS) strategy p(v z) specifies the selection of one of the V algorithms that 'map z into the output y, i.e., y = hj(z). (15) Again, it is assumed that the number of alternative algorithms V is finite, small, and prespecified.
The development of the analytical description of the response selection stage is identical to that for the situation assessment but with p(v z) in place of p(u). Each algorithm h contains a interconnected variables, denoted WUJr, which specify the input-output mapping (15) . The RS algorithm variables, together with the internal decision variable v and the output variable y, constitute the set of all variables of subsystem SII.
The existence of a command input v' from the rest of the organization modifies the decisionmaker's choice v. A final choice v-is obtained from
where b(v, v') defines a protocol according to which the command is used, i.e., the values of v-determined by b(v, v') reflect the degree of option restriction effected by the command. The overall process of mapping the assessed situation z-and the command input v' into the final choice v is represented by B in Fig. 3 , and the result of this process is a (deterministic) modification of the RS strategy p(v z-) into an effective RS strategyp(v-zv'). The processing of z-and v' to yield v-is done in subsystem SB which contains aB variables.
If the model of the decisionmaking process, Fig. 3 , is viewed as a system S consisting of subsystems sl, S', sB, and S" with inputs x, z', and v' and output y, then the partition law of information [17] (20) where GA gA( p(Z)), (21) G3 gB(p(Z)), (19) shows that G,1 depends on the two strategies p(u) and p(v z), even though a command input v' may exist. This implies that the command input modifies the DM's internal decision after p(v z) has been determined. Furthermore, it is possible for the command input to override totally the internal decision, i.e.,
The analysis and interpretation of the effects of z' and v' on the organization require further consideration of the types of interaction tnat can occur. Tiese depend on the information structure of the organization. A general representation of the interaction between one DM and the rest of the organization is shown in Fig. 4 . The overall input to the organization from its environment is a vector X'. In this case the information structure is defined by the two partitioning matrices III and flo [21] with x I11HX', x4 =l1X' (25) where x' is the input vector to the DM and x4 is the input vector to the rest of the organization (RO). In general, x4
and xl can be disjoint, overlapping partially, or even identical.
The coordination for the system S (20) contains the internal coordination within each subsystem plus the coordination due to the interaction between subsystems. The first term in (20) is identical to that of (4) for the situation assessment stage. The second term (21) and the third term (22) depend on the probability distributions of the internal assessment z and the modified assessment z, respectively. (26) where t is the average reaction time, i.e., the time between the arrival of the input and the generation of an output y. It is assumed that the decisionmaker must process his inputs at a rate that is at least equal to the rate with which inputs arrive. The latter has been modeled by T, the mean symbol interarrival time: t = cl + C2Gt <
The modeling assumptions in this paper are that where F can be considered as a rate of total activity and is measured in bits per second. Inequality (27) represents a mathematical expression of only one aspect of bounded rationality. Many other formulations are possible [5] . In order to describe the DM with bounded rationality, it is useful to classify first the possible decision strategies and then to introduce a mechanism for evaluating performance that is appropriate in both the optimizing and the satisficing contexts [5] .
Define a pure internal decision strategy to be one for which both the SA and RS strategies are pure, that is, an algorithm fi is selected with probability one, i.e., p(u i')= 1, for some I'
and algorithm h. is selected with probability one when the situation is assessed as being z,-M, i.e., p(V =' Z Zm) for somej' and for each zr,.
Since there are U pure situation assessment strategies and (29) which represents the probability of error in decisionmaking (Fig. 5) .
The information obtained from evaluating performance can be used by the organization designer in defining and allocating tasks, x's, to the decisionmaker and in changing the number and contents of the situation assessment and response selection algorithms. The latter is achieved through training and learning; these processes, however, are outside the scope of this model.
The following problems can be posed as a means for studying the properties of the internal decision strategies. Given the model of the decisionmaking process shown in Fig. 5 , where the internal processes are described by (14) , (17)- (20) , determine the internal strategies D( Pk) such that a) J(D( Pk)) is minimized, b) J is minimized subject to G(D(pk)) FT, c) J <J, and d) i J subject to G < FT. The first two are optimization problems while the latter two are formulated so as to obtain satisficing strategies with respect to a performance threshold J. The bounded rationality constraint depends on T; therefore, the internal strategies will also depend on the tempo of operations. The unconstrained cases a) and c) can be thought of as limiting cases when T -s Y0.
A useful way of describing the properties of the solutions to the four problems a)-d) is by introducing the plane (J, G); to each specific decision strategy corresponds a point, a pair (J, G), in that plane. Characterization of the locus of (J, G) pairs is accomplished by consideration of the functional dependence of J and G on D( Pk)* The total activity G is a convex function of the decision strategy, i.e.,
where GA is the total activity corresponding to the pure strategy DA. This follows from the definition of G as the sum of the marginal uncertainties H(w) of each system variable w [17] , and the fact that if the possible distributions p(w) are elements of a convex distribution space, then H(w) is a convex function of p(w) [19] . Now, corresponding to each strategy Dk is a distribution Pk(W) on w.
Furthermore, any mixed strategy determined according to a set of weightsPk will also determine a distribution p(w) as a convex combination of the distributions Pk(w) and hence a convex distribution space. Therefore if Equations (32) and (33) are parametric in 8 and give the relationship shown in Fig. 6 . The relative position of pairs (J1, G,) and (J2, G2) is arbitrary, i.e., it is not true in general that a smaller total activity G also realizes a worse performance.
Application of the above construction to all possible binary variations between pure strategies and then to successive binary combinations of mixed strategies leads to a region in the (J, G) plane that contains all possible strategies. Such a region for three pure strategies is shown in Fig. 7 .
The lower boundary of the region consists of the pure strategies and binary variations between pure strategies. It follows that the minimum J solution D, is a pure strategy as is the one that minimizes G (D3 in Fig. 7) . The solution 2The (J, G) region shown represents the solution space for a specific numerical example [20] in which there are no inputs from the rest of the organization. to the problems a) and b) can be analyzed using the (J, G) representation.
a) The minimum error strategy will always be a pure strategy. This is evident from the construction of the (J, G) region. b) The bounded rationality constraint is represented by a straight line parallel to the J axis. For a fixed value of the rate F, the bounded rationality threshold G,.
is proportional to the tempo of operations, i.e., Gr FT.
The decision strategy that minimizes the error can be pure or a convex combination of two pure strategies. The specific solution depends on the intersection of the boundary of the (J, G) region with the G, line. Two types of intersection are possible, as shown in Fig.  8 . For T = 1 the minimum error is achieved by the (pure) strategy corresponding to the point (J,, G,), which is also the solution obtained to problem a). However, as T decreases, it may no longer be possible to use the optimal strategy, as illustrated in Fig. 8 forT X T2. In that case the minimum error strategy is a binary variation between pure strategies.
As T decreases, i.e., the tempo of operations increases, there exists in general some value T T0 below which the solution set is empty. This means that the rate of input arrivals is too fast for adequate processing of all incoming inputs. Such a condition represents an overload of the decisionmaker.
The solutions to the satisficing problems c) and d) can be characterized as the set of feasible solutions Pk to The condition (34) specifies a partition of the solution region by the vertical line J = J as shown in Fig. 9 . Note that while, in general, an infinite number of decision strategies (shaded region) are satisficing, the difference in total activity between them can be quite large. Also, if the performance threshold J is less than the minimum Jk, then no satisficing solution exists.
The solution to the satisficing problem with a bounded rationality constraint d) is obtained readily as the set of strategies, represented by values of Pk, which yield (J, G) pairs in the region defined by
Several types of intersection are possible depending on the values of X and J. For T sufficiently large the set of satisficing strategies includes the minimum error strategy ( '1 in Fig. 9 ). As T decreases, however, the solution set may contain only mixed strategies ( -T2), i.e., strategies for which the amount of internal decisionmaking G,, is nonzero. If T is decreased sufficiently (T T3) then the satisficing solution set is empty. The decision task can be accomplished but the performance will not be good enough, i.e., the constraint J < J will be violated. Finally, there exist values of T (T < T) for which the task cannot be accomplished.
The analysis using the (J, G) plane has shown that the minimum probability of error is realized by a pure strategy when no constraints are present. When the bounded rationality constraint is introduced, then it is possible for the optimal strategy to be a mixed one. In the satisficing context it is also possible that when the constraint of bounded rationality is imposed, all satisficing strategies be mixed ones.
The effect of modeling bounded rationality as a constraint on the total activity G rather than on the throughput Gt can be illustrated by comparing the magnitudes of the components of G. The throughput and blockage, together, are identically equal to the uncertainty in the input (18) , G, + Gb = H(x, z', v') < log N + log M' + log V' (36) where N, M', and V' are the number of elements in the alphabets of x, z', and v', respectively. Similarly, an upper bound for G, is obtained when each SA and RS algorithm is chosen with frequency 1 /U and 1/V, respectively:
In general, the marginal uncertainty of each variable of the system is bounded from above by the logarithm of the size of its alphabet. Therefore use of (14) applied to the whole system yields a bound for the total activity: 
where M and Y are the sizes of the alphabets of z and y and a' is the number of variables in the ith subsystem.
Since the number of algorithm variables is in general orders of magnitude larger than the logarithm (base 2) of the alphabet sizes, it follows that the value of G is determined primarily by the number of variables in the system. Furthermore, comparison of (36) and (37) with (38) indicates that the coordination term G, will be much greater than any of the other terms in the partition law. This is a reasonable conclusion for systems that include internal processing. An important class of systems for which the above statements do not hold is that of throughput-only systems, i.e., channels.
As an illustration of the relative magnitude of the various terms, the results from a simple example [20] are shown in Table I . It is the same example from which Figs. 7-9 were extracted.
The input was constructed to consist of 486 elements, all equally likely to occur; hence the blockage and throughput realized their upper bound at 8.9 bits. The upper bound on the total activity was computed to be 972 bits. Note in Table I that the pure strategies correspond to zero G,1 as expected, and that the coordination terms GC clearly dominate. In addition, the use of a mixed strategy results in a significant increase in coordination due to the initialization of algorithms. Fig. 3 are of the result-sharing form of cooperating behavior [221. The situation input z' represents the result of data processing and aggregation in RO which is passed to the DM. Similarly, the command input v' can be regarded as the result of another decision process which occurs within the RO.
In the context of organization theory the functional characteristics of subsystems SA and SB that define the specific form of the interactions can be chosen so that lateral relationships as well as hierarchical ones can be presented [14] . For example the function b(v, v') may be such that the command input serves to coordinate the response selection activities of two DM's of the same rank (same echelon) or it can be that the command input may be a direct command from a superior. Similarly, the situation assessment input z' can be generated at many different levels within RO.
Another interpretation of the two interactions is in terms of influence and authority [23] . Authority is defined as the ability to exert influence or control, the laLter is pifesecL when a DM's exercise of discretion is limited externally. Discretion has been interpreted in this model as the internal decisionmaking. Simon writes [23] that the basic method .for such limitation is the alteration of the premises on which the DM bases his decisions. Since the effective RS strategy is p(v zv'), it is clear that there are two premises on which the decision v is based: the modified situation assessment z and the command input v'. Thus, the organization can exert control either indirectly through z' or directly through v'.
Indirect control is present when the supplementary situation assessment input z' modifies z. This modification may or may not improve the performance. It will improve performance if it leads to an improved situation assessment However if it is possible for the rest of the organization to provide the DM with a z' based on x4 that leads to improved performance, it is also possible to construct a z' that leads to lower performance. For example z' may represent bad or misleading information received by the DM in the belief that it is reliable information provided by RO. In either case, the DM's performance is controlled indirectly by RO.
The presence of the situation input z' can cause a significant increase or decrease in the total activity G. The former is indicated in (20) , where subsystem SA introduces additional coordination, denoted by G,. However in spite of this additional coordination, it may also be that the total activity present is decreased. Recall that the coordination within each RS algorithm is dependent on the characteristics (i.e., entropy) of its respective input. If the processing within the SA subsystem is such that the input entropy to S" is reduced, it is possible that the additional coordination activity within SA may be offset by a reduction in coordination activity within S".
Direct control is modeled through the command input v' and the protocol function b(v, v') specifies the degree of direct control that the rest of the organization exerts on the DM. The extreme case of direct control occurs when
i.e., when the command input specifies fully the selection of the RS algorithm. It is clear the v' affects the performance of the DM either beneficially or adversely through the modification of the RS strategy p(v z). Furthermore, the existence of a command input may also increase or decrease the total load G. Additional load is evident from (22) (G,); on the other hand v' may be so restrictive as to reduce substantially the processing in the RS stage, thus causing reduction in the total G.
The various cases described in the discussion of direct and indirect control can be analyzed using (17)-(24). The specific assumptions appropriate to each case can be used to reduce the general expressions (17)-(24). For example, if the properties of indirect control alone are of interest, then one may set v = v, v' 0 and eliminate SB from the various expressions. In general the effect of a particular type of interaction on the performance and total activity of the DM can be analyzed using the procedure presented in Section III. Specifically, for a given internal decision strategy D( Pk) the locus of the (J, G) pairs corresponding to variations in the characteristics of an input from RO can be constructed. It will have the same properties as the construction in Section III, i.e., extreme points of the locus will correspond to deterministic inputs from RO, the total activity will be a convex function of the distribution on possible input symbols, and the performance will be obtained as a convex combination of those values obtained for extreme points. The case of arbitrary variations between decision strategy and RO interaction is a research problem under study in the context of multiple interacting decisionmakers.
V. CONCLUSION
Qualitative notions of decisionmaking have been combined with concepts from n-dimensional information theory into a working model which represents the decisionmaking process of a well trained commander in the performance of a well-defined decisionmaking task. In particular, a basic model has been developed in the form of a two-stage process in which the situation is first assessed, and then a response based on the assessed situation is selected. The assessment of the situation and the selection of the response can be affected, directly or indirectly, by inputs from the rest of the organization.
This specialized model of the human decisionmaker, believed appropriate for the study of organizational form problems, places emphasis on the internal choices made during the decisionmaking process. These choices, modeled as switches for selecting from two finite prespecified sets of deterministic algorithms, constitute an internal decision strategy. The stochastic version of the Partition Law of Information is used to express total internal processing as a function of the internal strategy.
The properties of the model were studied by expressing the index of performance as a function of the internal strategies. Decision strategies which realize optimal performance or satisficing performance subject to the bounded rationality constraint were obtained directly by constructing the locus of all solutions in the total activityperformance (or J, G) plane. It was shown that optimal performance can be achieved through pure strategies and, depending on the value of the bounded rationality constraint, through mixed ones. Satisficing strategies are in general mixed, but may include pure strategies. It is also possible for all satisficing strategies to be mixed ones only, i.e., the decisionmaker has to alternate among options in order to achieve satisficing performance and not violate the bounded rationality constraint.
It was also shown that alternating among options requires additional activity in the form of re-initialization of algorithm variables particular to each option. This activity and the coordination activity required to execute each option once it is chosen constitute a significant part of the total activity in the decisionmaking process.
The interaction of the single DM with the rest of the organization was modeled in terms of two inputs, supplementary situation assessment and direct command. The notion of indirect control was shown to correspond to the former and direct control to the latter. It was then shown that these controls can affect the performance J and the total activity G of the DM either beneficially or adversely, depending on the specific case being considered.
The basic model presented in this paper has the potential to become a useful tool in the analysis of certain classes of organizational form problems. Consequently, the immediate direction of the research effort is in the formulation and analysis of multiperson organizational structures.
APPENDIX
The mutual information (coordination) among n variables xi is defined as It is often more convenient however to evaluate the total coordination of a system consisting of m subsystems as the sum of the coordinations within each subsystem and the coordination among subsystems.
In the system shown in Fig. 2 where H( pi) is H( p(u i)). Thus, the coordination for subsystem S' takes the form given by (1 1).
